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This is a review of risk and crisis communication practices in British Columbia, Canada, 
followed by organizations involved in wildfire emergency management. With a focus on the 
interior of the province, this report discusses challenges and opportunities while suggesting a 
cycle-based model for practicing risk and crisis communication that may be more effective at 
mitigating risk, building trust, and improving how communication is done with internal and 
external stakeholders. 
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The nature of wildfire events in British Columbia has changed in recent years. With 
climate-change increasing the frequency, scale and duration of fires in the Province, there exists 
a need to revisit existing approaches to risk and crisis communication.  
This report provides a synthesis of communication models frequently cited in the 
literature. Through consultation with organizations involved in wildfire risk management in the 
interior of the province, the report explores current approaches, gaps, use of the Incident 
Command System, internal and external communication challenges, and other related issues.  
We conclude that an opportunity exits to improve how risk and crisis communication are 
currently conducted and propose a life cycle-based model. This model recognizes that 
differences exist at pre-event, intra-event, and post-event stages of a wildfire. Moreover, these 
stages shift from risk communication to crisis communication to a hybrid crisis-risk 
communication approach across these stages. Each stage also includes key features or elements 
that need to be a primary focus. Our proposed model emphasizes the centrality of 
local/Indigenous knowledge and the primacy of recognizing how wildfire events can affect 
perceptions of safety and impact the mental health and well-being of individuals and 
communities. In short, better risk and crisis communication practices lead to less loss of property 
and human lives, more trust, and higher levels of resiliency. 
Recommendations include distinguishing between risk and crisis communication, 
reviewing trust and how it is built or lost, supporting amateur radio, satellite, cellular and 
broadband in remote and First Nations communities, studying ways to reduce staff turnover and 
loss of experience, and systematically dissecting parallel natural hazards for training and 





1.0 Overview / Setting the context 
 
Models for risk and crisis communication have evolved over recent decades with a shift from 
command-and-control, top-down, linear approaches to holistic, cyclic models that strive for 
greater transparency. These newer models are people-centered, include a wider range of 
stakeholders, and they are designed to (re)build trust. The main deficiency with these models is 
that they fail to consider the life cycle of a disaster, or how to effectively use different 
approaches at various points in this life cycle. They also inadequately distinguish between risk 
and crisis communication. 
Risk and crisis communication should be different at pre-disaster, intra-disaster, and post-
disaster stages. Moreover, it is important to determine thresholds, indicators, and transition 
points for shifting from one approach to the next. Standard risk and crisis communication models 
– even the more evolved and holistic ones - tend to apply a one-size-fits-all approach which may 
be ineffective during natural disasters. Regional differences and context matter. 
Existing models also fail to distinguish between internal and external communication, and 
poorly explain how best to incorporate multiple stakeholders from various levels of government 
including First Nations, first responders, healthcare providers, media, and others.  
This knowledge synthesis will focus on reviewing existing models, and move towards 
developing a multi-modal, life cycle approach. Consultation with key stakeholders informs this 
research, and an initial emphasis will be placed on wildfire risk mitigation in the context of the 
interior region of British Columbia. 
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 The need for this research is heightened given a report by Abbott and Chapman (2018) 
where the following conclusions on disaster management in British Columbia require 
examination within the context of this study. First, it is essential for communities to have access 
to timely and accurate information during a wildfire event. Second, efforts to include local and 
Indigenous knowledge in the response must be real and meaningful. Third, the response must 
recognize existing local governance structures where First Nations are treated as partners rather 
than as receivers of risk management interventions. Fourth, that comprehensive and regularly 
updated databases be available with contact information for all First Nations communities in 
B.C. Lastly, that ongoing education programs be established to reduce risk. Abbott and Chapman 
(2018) included dozens of additional recommendations in their report. We have selected this 
particular set since it fits most closely our goal of exploring the development of a new risk and 
crisis communication model. 
 
1.1 A review of risk and crisis communication 
In recent decades, the nature of risk has changed significantly. Since 1970, the number of 
disasters worldwide has more than quadrupled (Economist, 2017). Natural disasters including 
floods, wildfires, tsunamis, extreme weather events, and avalanches are of particular concern in 
British Columbia, and there is a growing recognition that communication before, during, and 
after such events is a powerful influencer of individual and institutional risk decision-making and 
behavior. Furthermore, wildfires are becoming extremely complex (Tedim et al., 2020), and 
concerns regarding impacts on air quality were heightened in 2017 and 2018. These issues are 
magnified given the propensity of climate change to increase the threats posed by wildfire, and 
how this may impair the resiliency of communities (Eisenberg et al., 2019). 
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Risk information must be expressed clearly with uncertainties explained, and this can be 
done at the pre-event stage through education and stakeholder engagement to help reduce 
misunderstandings during an event. The fluid and quickly evolving nature of natural disasters 
makes risk and crisis communication a complex, sometimes ad hoc approach, where agencies 
responsible for managing the situation easily become targets of discontent and criticism from a 
wide range of actors. This has been called by Nilsson and Enander (2020) when discussing 
wildfires a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation where media focus quickly shifts 
from questions regarding the root cause of the disaster, to how the situation was allowed to 
escalate, and who is to blame. During a disaster, communication is often considered by critics as 
insufficient in terms of timeliness and comprehensiveness, and concerns exist regarding the 
consistency of information provided (Sutton et al., 2020). This can generate controversy, 
increase costs, lead to additional negative environmental and human health outcomes, and make 
the risk management process needlessly complicated. It may also generate legal liability.  
Risk communication is the purposeful flow of information between institutions and 
individuals (Covello et al., 1986), whereas crisis communication is more usually found in the 
field of public relations where an emphasis is on reputation management (Coombs and Holladay, 
2010). Risk communication is the dissemination of information prior to an event, whereas crisis 
communication is the sharing of information during an event. Both risk and crisis 
communication have evolved given the introduction of social media (Acar and Muraki, 2011; 
Ultz, Schultz, and Glocka, 2011), and it is clear that social media is proving to be a double-edged 
sword for a lot of organizations who have new avenues to quickly disseminate information 
including detailed maps, graphs, and videos while at the same time being required to manage 
expectations, alternative interpretations, and even misinformation.  Social media can also 
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accelerate the speed, accuracy, and veracity of information requests and this can sometimes 
generate uneven flows of information to various stakeholders leading to confusion and anxiety. 
 
1.2 Existing risk and crisis communication models 
Risk communication focuses on raising awareness, education, motivating individuals to 
act, reaching agreement, and obtaining, maintaining or rebuilding trust (Bier, 2001). It usually 
begins before a wildfire has started and it should be thought of as a long-term process of 
engagement and preparation. Risk communication is primarily oriented towards external 
stakeholders including the general public. By contrast, crisis communication occurs once a 
hazard has materialized. It involves internal and external stakeholders, and an emphasis is placed 
on inter-agency coordination, mobilization of the public to evacuate in some cases, and on highly 
specific locations and timelines as a wildfire event evolves. 
A typology of models of risk and crisis communication commonly found in the literature 
includes the following as explained by Leiss (1996), and they incorporate lessons that were 
learned from mistakes made in the past (Fischhoff, 1995). These three model categories provide 
a good typology that allows for additional models and variations to be conceptualized. 
 
Information flow model: This model is rooted in legal frameworks and is based on a “duty to 
warn.” Communication pathways are one-way from expert/industry/government agency to the 
public. The mass media, and now social media, are typically the mode of transmission. The 
information flow model is the dominant approach used today for crisis communication. 
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Message transmission model: This approach is based on an engineering theory of 
communications using a source, channel, and receiver approach. The focus is on quality of the 
message including the impact of distortion. Additionally, many early risk communication 
training programs focused on how to build capacity for communicators based on teaching them 
appropriate phrasing as well as managing non-verbal cues including eye contact, posture, and 
general appearance. This model has less utility today and only remnants of it can be found in 
modern practices including press conferences. 
 
Communication process models: These models incorporate features of the two models above and 
are based on the interplay between technical risk and perceived risk. There is a misguided 
assumption that we can meaningfully distinguish between “real” risk and perceived risk when it 
is clear that all risks are socially processed and subject to cognitive and perceptual biases. It is 
assumed that government acts as a bridge between these two domains.  
In Canada, most federal government agencies use a variant of Health Canada’s Strategic 
Risk Communication Framework (Health Canada, 2006) where risk communication is defined 
as: “any exchange of information concerning the existence, nature, form, severity, or 
acceptability of health and environmental risks.” This cyclic model is a process-based approach 
for interacting with stakeholders which involves identifying issues, assessing risks and benefits, 
option analyses, selection of a strategy, implementation of the strategy, and monitoring and 
evaluating outcomes.  
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The framework is considered a strategic approach, evidence-based, stakeholder-oriented, 
transparent, and focused on continuous improvement.  
Other variants include the Risk Information Seeking and Processing (RISP) model which 
focuses on how individuals seek information before and during a disaster based on perceived 
characteristics of the hazard, affective responses, and motivation (Griffin, Dunwoody, and 









Internal and between organization risk and crisis communication may involve application 
of something called the Holistic S-HELP DSS Framework for overcoming challenges due to lack 
of coordination, information sharing, interoperability, and managing the effects of information 




Holistic S-HELP DSS Framework 
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Holistic-S-HELP-DSS-Framework_fig1_332178997 
 
The Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) is based on how people respond to 
disasters, and it includes how information is processed based on environmental and social cues 









Another model reviewed is called a “people-centered” approach where there is a shift 
from a top-down, command-and-control style to more inclusion to increase participation (Siddall 
and Bennett, 1987; Scolobig et al., 2015). The main objective of this approach is to redistribute 
how risk management is carried out during disasters by building institutional capacity through 
inter-agency collaboration. Although not specifically a risk or crisis communication model, such 
an approach is assumed to be useful for establishing new and better quality communication 
pathways and formal frameworks of accountability. It is designed for smaller audiences and 
communities where local knowledge is deemed germane. The model itself involves a 
bidirectional set of pathways between three entities; namely, local authorities, scientific advisors, 
and the public. 
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Risk communication models have come from health-related fields as well. For example, 
Berry et al. (2013) in discussing communicable diseases posits the following as a tool for 
lowering mortality and morbidity rates. 
 
 
Seeger et al. (2018) developed the following complex model to explain emergency risk 
communication. This conceptual model is one of a handful found in the literature to recognize 
the importance of managing and communicating risk issues taking into consideration a lifecycle-






Zhang, Li, and Chen (2020) presented the following model of effective risk 
communication during COVID-19 to deal with the outbreak of the virus in Wuhan, China. Their 
model illustrates how collaboration of experts, government, and the public can reduce risk, 





The International Risk Governance Council developed the following interdisciplinary 
approach with a strong emphasis on assessing different kinds and levels of uncertainty. The 
model also highlights the importance of recognizing how the technical, social, and psychological 
come into risk communication. A more complex model was published in 2012 but the 2005 
example as discussed by Jansen et al. (2017) is included here since it contains more detail 




1.3 The Incident Command System and application in British Columbia 
The Incident Command System approach is central to the British Columbia Emergency 
Management System, and it is an organizational structure used to manage emergency situations 
(Government of B.C., 2002). Although not strictly a risk or crisis communication model, it 
represents a modular approach that requires robust internal and inter-agency communication and 
coordination.  
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 To understand the flow and organizational responsibilities during an incident, the 
following analysis represents a simplified depiction of how information and decision-making is 




1. Incident Commander (Crew Leader)   
a. On the ground decision making and communicating with Zone/ Regional Wildfire 
Cordination officer (Z/RWCO) and Fire Center (FC) Dispatch. 
2. ZWCO/ RWCO 
a. Liaises with local stakeholders, fulfills IC’s resource requests. Provides fire 












3. The Fire Center Information Officer will communicate hazard information and often 
share relevant information from the Local Government/ FN who issued the restrictions. 
4. Local Government (LG)/ First Nation (FN) 
a. Based on recommendations from Z/RWCO, the LG / FN will determine what (if 
any) Evacuation Alerts or Orders to implement. If needed, refer to large wildfire 
incident flow chart.  
5. Local Government Information Officer 
a. Responsible for communicating with the public.   
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Large Wildfire: This model is a piece of a larger model.  




a. On the ground decision making and communicating up the chain of command 
within the Incident Management Team (IMT): Crew Leader to Division 
Supervisor to Operations Section Chief to Incident Comander (IC). 
















a. IC- head of the IMT- ranging in size based on size and complexity of the incident 
(it expands and contracts throughout the incident).  
b. Relevant Command Staff:  
i. Liaison Officer (LO)- communicates with internal stakeholders- FN, 
industry, EOC, LG, other response organizations. 
ii. Information Officer (IO)- communicates with external stakeholders- 
public, media.  
3. BCWS Provincial Wildfire Coordination Center (PWCC) and Regional Fire Centers (FC) 
a. BC has six FCs, each with a full-time staff following the ICS structure. Led by the 
FC Manager or designate, they have all the roles found within an IMT (most IMT 
staff on roster are from the FC level). They have IOs who communicate with the 
public, the media, internal, and external stakeholders with risk communication 
(before and after an incident) and crisis communication during an incident. 
During an evacuation Alert/ Order, they will often share relevant information 
from the LG / FN who issued the restrictions.  
b. The PWCC (based in Kamloops) is the next level above FC and follows a similar 
ICS operational structure.  
4. Local Government (LG) / First Nation (FN) 
a. Based on recommendations from the IMT, the LG / FN will determine what (if 
any) Evacuation Alerts or Orders to implement.  
b. The Local Governments responsibilities are described in the BC Government’s 
(1996) Emergency Program Act. Appendix C contains the portion related to 
declaring a Local State of Emergency and Orders.  
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c. Emergency Operations Center (EOC)- typically uses Incident Command Structure 
like the IMT. Well established EOCs will include an IO which is an important 
role for crisis communication during the incident. Ideally, this same person will 
be conducting risk communication prior and after an incident as well, even when 
the EOC is not activated.  
d. The LG is also responsible for establishing the Emergency Support Services 
(ESS) with funding support from EMBC available. There are mobile ESS units 
available for deployment upon request. 
e. The LG is responsible for developing, maintaining, and implementing a Local 
Emergency Plan. 
5. The Minister of Public Safety 
a. As outlined in the Emergency Program Act, the Minister is responsible for 
signing off on all State of Emergencies and subsequent evacuation orders and 
alerts. In practice, this is a formality which often does not occur until during or 
after the evacuation has occurred. 
6. Emergency Management BC (EMBC)  
a. Formerly known as Provincial Emergency Plan (PEP) 
b. Overarching emergency management organization responsible to plan for and 
coordinate the response to provincial emergencies.  
c. Information flows from response organizations (BCWS) to EMBC through 
Coordination Prep Meetings with stakeholders that increase from weekly to daily 
as hazard escalates. 
7. EmergencyInfoBC 
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A program within EMBC responsible for disseminating risk and crisis 
information to the public. They receive their information through internal 
channels of EMBC and relationships stakeholders. One primary means of rapid 
information sharing is Twitter. 
 





2.1 Examples of communication approaches and application of holistic models 
In a study on risk and crisis communication, Steelman and McCaffrey (2013) examined 
how communication before and during three wildfires in California, Wyoming, and Montana 
could improve by becoming more holistic and flexible with respect to fire management 
strategies. To understand these characteristics, key informants including federal fire managers 
and local officials were interviewed. Members of the public within affected communities also 
participated in the study. Interviewees were asked about pre-fire activities, fire communication 
strategies during an event, and their overall evaluation of how well the fire was managed.  
Steelman and McCaffrey (2013) identified several factors that should be considered when 
developing new models of risk and crisis communication, and for reviewing how well wildfires 
were managed. These include the following: 
(1) The use of interactive processes involving dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders to 
identify risk perspectives and how they might be addressed. 
(2) Delivery of messages and content that fits a community’s circumstances and social 
context. 
(3) Providing honest, timely, accurate, and reliable information. 
(4) Using credible authority figures with local legitimacy within established communication 
channels. 
(5) Communicating before and during incidents to leverage pre-established relationships.  
The study suggests that each of these factors can be evaluated independently but also together to 
yield a deeper understanding of the effectiveness of communication approaches. It is also 
suggested that these factors can be used to assess the resiliency of a community. 
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In 2008, the Gap Fire in the Los Padres National Forest of California burned close to 
9500 acres. Adjacent to a dense urban interface, the fire threatened 3000 homes and put more 
than $2 billion of real estate at-risk. A full fire suppression approach using perimeter control was 
ultimately effective, and no homes were lost. During this fire, communication was primarily 
unidirectional and included the use of traditional media like radio, television, kiosks, and 
newspaper messaging. Notwithstanding the successful resolution of the fire, Steelman and 
McCaffrey (2013) reported that residents were frustrated by a lack of specific or timely 
information. Part of this was due to an associated power outage and the overtaxing of a call 
center.  
Pre-fire communication efforts were community driven and the U.S. Forest Service had a 
limited presence in the area. Information was primarily delivered by Incident Management Team 
members from outside the community who were not recognized as credible. To make matters 
worse, the Gap Fire occurred in a large, heavily populated wildland-urban interface region which 
created significant communication challenges with the diverse populations both before and 
during the event.  
By contrast, the Cascade Fire (2008) in the Custer National Forest of Montana, and the 
Gunbarrel Fire (2008) in the Shoshone National Forest in Wyoming, occurred in smaller, rural 
communities where it was assumed that communicating fire hazard was more straightforward 
and where building relationships with stakeholders could occur. 
The Cascade Fire utilized a modified suppression tactic with perimeter control on one 
side of the fire and monitoring on the other side. The communication strategy included 
interactive activities as well as more traditional, unidirectional communications. Radio stations 
broadcasted live community meetings, and a local webpage was set up with wildfire maps which 
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proved to be more popular than resources made available through the U.S. Forest Service 
wildfire website. 
The Incident Management Team involved in the Cascade Fire used a unified command 
model with the local fire chief functioning as Incident Commander despite the incident being 
outside of municipal jurisdiction. They also engaged volunteers to staff an information call 
center. These actions had the dual effect of providing the community with meaningful 
engagement while utilizing the fire chief’s personal relationships within the community. Prior to 
the incident, the county and U.S. Forest Service staff had worked on evacuation drills.  
For Steelman and McCaffrey (2013), the Gunbarrel Fire’s communication strategy was 
determined to be the most effective. This was attributed to pre-incident actions such as fuel 
management work to reduce hazards and educational programs to teach children and adults a 
range of fire response techniques. Homeowners were also taught about the risks they faced. The 
U.S. Forest Service worked cooperatively with local government and stakeholders, and actively 
volunteered in the community to build agency trust and credibility.  
During the fire, interactive and unidirectional communication approaches were used. The 
U.S. Forest Service and the Incident Management Team communicated directly with the highest 
risk stakeholders, and daily updates were emailed to all who subscribed to this service. The 
Incident Management Team was able to leverage the credibility of the U.S. Forest Service and 
personal relationships within the community to create high levels of trust. Even though the 
wildfire strategy used involved a monitor, confine, and contain strategy which was deemed 
controversial, and the fire burned 68,000 acres of forest, the public were satisfied because they 
understood why this strategy was used and felt consulted. 
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It is important to note that risk communication prior to an incident was key to community 
resilience during and after an incident. Steelman and McCaffrey (2013) observed that 
homeowners in the wildland-urban interface region of the Gap Fire who had higher subjective 
wildfire knowledge tended to undertake more risk reduction measures. Crisis communication 
was most effective when a credible agency representative used interactive processes that 
considered local knowledge and customs, provided timely, accurate, and useful information in a 
reliable, transparent, and honest manner. When new fire management approaches are used, 
additional communication with affected stakeholders ahead of an event is necessary to clarify the 
social context in which to frame, present, and discuss the risks during an incident. Without pre-
existing relationships to assess values and past performance record, stakeholders in a community 
make immediate, intuitive decisions about whether an unfamiliar approach makes sense. 
Although continual interactive communication requires resource commitments, these 
investments are key to ensuring community expectations are aligned with future management 
trends. 
A key conclusion from this study is that communication must involve building trust in the 
communicator, raising awareness, educating, reaching agreement, and motivating action. These 
actions prior to an event allow risk and crisis communication to effectively provide accurate 
information that stakeholders desire in a timely and trustworthy manner, and may result in less 






2.2 The role of risk perception and responses to wildfires 
It is important to understand how individuals perceive risk and the factors that influence 
how they respond to exposure to wildfire hazards. This research is still evolving and the use of it 
in building better risk and crisis communication models is needed. 
A study by Martin, Bender and Raish (2007) surveyed three wildland-urban interface 
communities in the western United States to explore these dynamics. The study examined the 
relationship between homeowners’ subjective knowledge, motivations, decision stages, and the 
number of risk-mitigating actions that they would undertake to protect their properties in high-
risk zones. The protection motivation theory (PMT) and the trans-theoretical model (TTM) were 
proposed as tools for better understanding these processes. 
It is argued that a risk-exposed individual goes through six decision-making stages which 
includes pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance, and termination. 
PMT and TTM are integrated and used to place individuals into three categories based on their 
involvement with wildfire mitigation; namely, pre-contemplative, contemplative, and action 
stages.  
Martin, Bender and Raish (2007) show that an individual’s perception of risk, and the 
type of knowledge they have of the hazard, is mediated by personal experience. According to 
PMT, individuals can be motivated to engage in positive behaviors to avoid health, social, and 
interpersonal risks if sound risk communication is provided. Personal evaluations of threats 
including severity, vulnerability, and benefit analyses, and coping factors like self-efficacy, 
response efficacy, and cost, are weighed by individuals to determine how much effort will be 
made to protect themselves from hazards. It is clear that effective risk communication can 
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support better individual decision-making by increasing awareness of a hazard in a manner that 
elicits these protective actions.  
It was also found that individual recollections of past experiences with a hazard type 
strongly influence responses to future events. Previous experience with similar kinds of hazards 
may elevate or moderate risk perceptions depending on how an individual was impacted, and 
how psychometric factors like causality, uncertainty, and voluntariness of exposure are 
interpreted by individuals. For this reason, communities with frequent exposure to wildfire 
hazards tend to more accurately assess the nature of the hazard, and demonstrate a willingness to 
increase investments in mitigation measures. For example, Martin, Bender and Raish (2007) 
noted that objections to adopting fire smart measures often include concerns about cost, the 
proximity of dense surrounding forests, and loss of aesthetic value of properties. The effect of 
nearby neighbors or management agency actions (or inactions) can influence homeowners to 
adopt a similar level of action. Fire insurance requirements had little effect in encouraging or 
discouraging residents from undertaking mitigation actions. 
From a practical perspective, it is clear that fire managers and others need to 
communicate risk in a way that increases the knowledge-base of individuals in a community. 
This can propel individuals up the trans-theoretical model (TTM) ladder leading from pre-
contemplation, contemplation, followed by action. To do this effectively, managers should 
distinguish between different groups and types of individuals in a community to ascertain what 
motivates them.  
Martin, Bender and Raish (2007) combined low/high subjective knowledge pre-
contemplative individuals and low knowledge contemplatives together since they appeared to be 
motivated by perceived vulnerability. In general, elevated perceptions of vulnerability led to 
	 31	
greater engagement in risk reduction behavior in such individuals. By comparison, the high 
knowledge contemplative group were more motivated by the severity of the risk. Low 
knowledge homeowners in the action stage were engaged in risk-reduction behavior to some 
degree. They were more likely to feel vulnerable to the consequences of an interface fire, and 
believed that such consequences were severe enough to implement further protective actions. 
This group of individuals reported the least number of impediments to undertaking risk-
mitigating behaviors.  
Fire managers are encouraged to utilize tangible examples from past fires in the region to 
educate the public. Before homeowners are ready to move into the action stage, they need to feel 
they have the knowledge, ability, and resources to mitigate risk and that their actions will be 
effective.  
Martin, Bender and Raish (2007) also recommended that fire managers use targeted one-
on-one information strategies designed to address the issues of a particular property or physical 
characteristics of a region. Demonstration plots that highlight ideal defensible spaces, property 
assessments with recommendations of specific risk-reduction measures, and free or low-cost 
resources to remove fuel loads were shown to be effective. All of this requires trust with local 
stakeholders and community leaders and the leveraging of existing relationships. It is important 
to note that general information communicated through pamphlets, media, and public 
presentations were found to have low motivational effects. Although it seems likely that there is 
some value in using these approaches, more research is needed to understand the relative 
contributions of other educational and communication techniques. 
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It is clear from this work that fire managers and other involved in communication need to 
recognize the heterogeneity of the public. Segmentation of the public, and an understanding of 
what motivates individuals, will prove beneficial at the pre-wildfire stage in order to reduce risk. 
 
2.3 The relationship between public understanding and willingness to act upon wildfire risk 
reduction measures 
 Public understanding and support of fuel management practices like prescribed burns 
are more important than ever given debates on its effectiveness, ecological impacts, and issues 
around human exposures to particulate emissions. Toman, Shindler, and Brunson (2006)  
used principles from adult learning to study public reactions to commonly used communication 
techniques from fire agencies. A survey was sent by mail to members of the public in fire-prone 
communities in Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, and Utah. This research demonstrated a connection 
between public understanding of, and support for, fire and fuel management activities.  
Using the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), 
Toman, Shindler, and Brunson (2006) explored various kinds of persuasive communication 
approaches found in the field of social psychology. TRA is premised on a belief that behavioural 
change can be promoted through communication strategies that target individual attitudes and 
subjective norms. The ELM approach focuses on communication around salient beliefs, while 
considering the relevance of the message’s content, and the credibility of the information 
provider.  
The study suggests that adults learn information about hazards associated with wildfires in a 
variety of ways. Most use a problem-based rather than a subject-based approach. It is important 
to recognize the role of prior experiences and knowledge, especially for solving natural resource 
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problems such as fuel hazard management. However, past experience can create assumptions and 
biases that may block new information from being processed and acted upon. In general, adults 
tend to prefer autonomy and control over their learning experiences and this requires the creation 
of a trusting and safe environment that fosters effective bi-directional information exchange. 
Agencies need to incorporate these principles to be seen as credible and relevant by people 
targeted for risk-based communications programming.  
More specifically, Toman, Shindler, and Brunson (2006) found that interactive methods were 
more effective than top-down approaches. The two most effective approaches were the use of 
interpretive centers and guided field trips. While interactive methods were most useful to 
receivers of information, unidirectional communications were particularly useful for building 
general public awareness about an issue or problem and were deemed cost-effective. 
Unfortunately, it was hard to determine if mass media mediated information was received and 
understood by participants in this study.  
Interactive methods were better at encouraging a shift in attitudes and behaviours. The 
problem-centered approach explored in this study used salient, real-world examples that focused 
on things like local conditions and potential outcomes. Communication strategies that targeted 
these specific circumstances were most effective when they also provided a rationale to explain 
practices and potential outcomes on the effective of mitigating wildfire risk. Interactive programs 
worked with individual knowledge and experience to positively shape attitudes and 
understanding of management actions and priorities. Again, trust between people and agencies 
responsible for wildfire risk reduction was vital to the success of these management strategies. 
Toman, Shindler, and Brunson (2006) noted that public meetings were the lowest ranked of 
all communication methods by participants in their study, and they were found to be only 
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nominally interactive. Respondents felt that they were “talked at” and given no chance to 
participate in discussions and agency trust eroded. It was suggested that meetings should occur 
early in any plan development, and should include representatives from all stakeholder groups 
who are shown that their contributions matter. 
Before initiating communication plans, agencies need to determine specific goals and desired 
outcomes. While unidirectional, standardized communication is more cost-effective, messaging 
will often be missed, and local priorities and geographic conditions will be lost. Standardized 
communication assumes a homogeneous audience. Since heterogeneity is the norm, a 
standardized approach misses the mark for many, if not most, stakeholders. Interactive models 
are more time consuming but, if based on the principles of adult learning, they should provide 
more meaningful and lasting change in attitudes and behaviours. Practices, such as prescribed 
burning, are more likely to be accepted if homeowners understand the reasoning for it and are 
given an opportunity to personally engage in a discussion about its merits, risks, and potential 
outcomes. Fire managers should also be willing to openly engage in discussions on alternatives, 
and have an open mind to these options. 
 
2.4 Climate change-mediated wildfire risk and communicating with the public 
As wildfires increase in frequency and scale due to factors associated with climate 
change including temperature, earlier snowmelts, and drought, it is becoming clear that a need 
exists to develop better models of risk and crisis communication sensitive to these factors.  
Wilson, McCaffrey, and Toman (2017) discussed the challenges associated with the 
expansion of wildland-urban interfaces, the use of prescribed burning as a fuel management tool, 
and climate change.  They noted that the area of wildland-urban interfaces in the western part of 
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the United States increased by 52% from 1970 to 2000, and the importance of a joint response 
between homeowners, fire agencies, and resource management companies to reduce risk.  
In their analysis, the authors review the motivations and inhibitors of homeowners to 
engage in fire smart actions. Although there is high public support (80%) for the use of 
prescribed fire as a management tool amongst participants in this study, many internal and 
external factors prevent this approach from being regularly used. It was recommended that four 
strategies be used to communicate risk and to increase acceptance of prescribed burning: 
(1) Promote increased efficacy through interactive learning. Interactive learning is the most 
effective model of communication to encourage preparedness before and during an 
incident. An interactive approach should be based on local context in a manner consistent 
with adult learning. This builds the highest degree of understanding and acceptance of 
fuel management practices. During an incident, evacuees rely on interactive information 
sources including public meetings and conversations with fire representatives. The 
effectiveness of public meetings appears to be mixed as noted previously. More research 
is required on this topic in order to make definitive conclusions. Informal interactions 
between community members have a major influence on understanding the potential 
consequences of fire and mitigation activities.  
(2) Build trust and capacity through social interaction. The development of relationships 
between communities and resource managers increases preparedness and trust. 
Interactive communication brings individuals together and builds social networks, which 
foster shared goals and a mutual sense of responsibility to prepare for future events. 
Engagement of a critical mass of the community is needed to encourage collective 
wildfire risk mitigation efforts. There is a need for participatory decision-making. 
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Stakeholders need a chance to identify shared values, goals, and motivations which are 
all critical drivers of trust. Individuals trust and give more weight to information from 
neighbours than public sources so, building community networks are important to 
disseminate information quickly to all residents.  
(3) Account for behavioral constraints and barriers to action. The Theory of Planned 
Behavior identifies that an increase in participation occurs when there is a positive 
attitude towards a particular behaviour, social pressure to adopt the behaviour, and 
perceived behavioural control such as a sense of high self-efficacy. Time, cost, lack of 
equipment or physical ability, and low self-efficacy are the main barriers for individuals 
preforming mitigation actions. Means to overcome these challenges must be included in 
pre-incident planning.  
(4) Facilitate thoughtful consideration of risk-benefit trade-offs. Every action or inaction 
comes with inherent trade-offs. These shift over time and communication needs to 
tangibly demonstrate potential risks and benefits different options available to 
homeowners. Communication needs to focus on long-term planning rather than on short-
term impacts, despite these being more concrete.  
(5) Overall, Wilson, McCaffrey, and Toman (2017) found that, while climate change is 
increasing wildfire and other natural disaster’s frequency, intensity, and severity, 
homeowners do not need to link the two to increase fire smart actions and reduce risks. 
Wildland-urban interface communities need the opportunity to interactively engage with 




2.5 Social media and crisis communication 
 The rise of the Internet, and of social media in particular, has multiple impacts on how 
risk and crisis communication is conducted in the 21st century. In a meta-analysis of more than 
100 scholarly papers on the use of social media in relation to natural and technological disasters 
published between 2007 and 2019, Saroj and Pal (2020) provided recommendations to disaster 
management organizations on best practices. Their aim was to explore how different 
stakeholders used social media during an event, and to discuss how best to disseminate 
information, increase preparedness, and encourage risk mitigation actions.  
 Currently, social media is primarily used by disaster management organizations to 
disseminate information to the public. In rapidly evolving emergencies, traditional broadcast 
media including television, radio, and newspapers struggle to provide updated and locally 
specific information. Communication specialists can utilize different social media platforms 
based on their target audiences and messaging options.  For instance, Twitter is superior for real-
time notification, Facebook increases community engagement, and blogs deliver more in-depth 
background details. All of these media can be used to share other kinds of information including 
video, real-time mapping, etc. Due to social media’s capacity and interactive qualities, there are 
major opportunities for early crisis detection and communication. Additionally, data gathered by 
management organizations from public postings allows social media to function as a 
bidirectional communications platform, and to improve emergency response. 
Saroj and Pal (2020) list five important lessons. First, risk assessment needs to be 
conducted and communicated prior to an incident. Second, adequate resources and effective 
social media team development is necessary, and it must be backed by government agency 
actions. As with all risk communication, interactive social media has high costs but is more 
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effective and may result in greater public tolerance to mistakes and missteps. It is interesting to 
note that public acceptance of mistakes through social media appear to be given greater leeway 
than in traditional media. Third, if the government fails to provide meaningful information, the 
public will attempt to fill the gap and this increases the risk that false or poorly contextualized 
information will spread. In other words, a “risk communication vacuum” will invariably be filled 
with information that is difficult to dislodge later. Fourth, risk control measures are more 
important than risk analysis to the public. Lastly, official social media accounts of disaster 
organizations and governments need to actively interact with the public and traditional media 
before, during, and following an event. 
Despite the challenges associated with the circulation of false or misleading news, social 
media should be the primary tool for crisis and risk communication due to its instantaneous and 
wide reach, and its ability to remain functional during most kinds of disasters. Credibility 
concerns can be reduced by using official social media accounts to provide timely, accurate 
information and to respond appropriately to feedback from the general public.  
Social media is a constantly evolving medium which brings new opportunities and tools 
to engage with users who look to both receive and share incident location, time information and 
to offer emotional, medical, or material supports. It seems likely that the development of new 
apps will increase the tools that managers have to identify incidents and to share crisis 
information with specific demographics. 
 
2.6 Risk and crisis communication during an evacuation 
 In May of 2011, the Whitefish Lake First Nation in Alberta was evacuated due to a 
wildfire in the region. This community was significantly affected by the Utikuma Lake complex 
	 39	
fire located south of Slave Lake that burned approximately 100,000 Hectares. Residents were 
evacuated for up to three weeks. 
Christianson, McGee, and Whitefish Lake First Nation #459 (2019) studied 45 band 
members’ perspectives and experiences on this evacuation using a semi-structured interview 
approach.  Previous research showed that wildfire evacuations have negative impacts on 
evacuees, and that stress can be significant. A lack of control, questions about personal safety 
and the protection of property, and proximity to the hazard all conspire to elevate perceptions of 
risk. When combined with little advance notice, the stress of evacuation can be overwhelming to 
some, and long-term individual and community-level impacts are possible.  
In an earlier study by Epp, Haque, and Peers (1998) on three First Nations communities 
in Manitoba in 1995, evacuations were made more difficult due to communication issues and the 
absence of well-designed evacuation plans. Since approximately one third of wildfire 
evacuations in Canada involved Indigenous communities, and 60% of First Nations are found in 
wildland–urban interface regions, the need for better risk and crisis communication is clear. 
In particular, the Whitefish Lake First Nation and other First Nations in Canada are under 
federal jurisdiction while emergency response and wildfire management are provincial in scope. 
Emergency management in the Whitefish Lake First Nation existed within an agreement that 
delegated responsibility to the community, and Chief and Council led emergency responses 
including declaring an emergency and ordering evacuation. In the case of a high-risk scenario, 
many other agencies are involved to assist in the evacuation including the federal government, 
provincial government, police, non-governmental organizations, and communities/municipalities 
that host evacuees.  
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Christianson, McGee, and Whitefish Lake First Nation #459 (2019) concluded that 
several factors can be used to explain how individuals responded to the wildfire and the 
evacuation order. The researchers noted that the time to prepare for an evacuation varies with 
some participants having a few hours to get ready, while others had 15 minutes or less. Others, 
however, did not receive a call or order to evacuate and found out that there was a wildfire when 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police went door-to-door and advised people to leave immediately. 
Transportation was a major issue for the community. While some community members had 
personal vehicles, others lacked mobility. The elderly was especially a challenge given language 
difficulties.  
Due to a well-known shortage of adequate housing in First Nations communities, a fear 
of losing shelter magnified the anxiety experienced by evacuees. Moreover, media attention 
focused primarily on the non-indigenous community of Slave Lake making it difficult to get 
specific information about what was happening in Whitefish Lake. With many chronic health 
issues, there was a need to process and manage additional layers of risk due to the well-known 
interaction of wildfire smoke and the prevalence of asthma and bronchitis in the community.  
 To improve the outcomes of future evacuations, Christianson, McGee, and Whitefish 
Lake First Nation #459 (2019) recommended that government agencies should provide 
additional financial and other kinds of resources to First Nations communities for emergency 
management. This could involve hiring a full-time emergency manager who would also focus on 
development and implementation of emergency plans that were customized to a community. A 
clear need to deal with transportation issues was also noted, as was the need for a translator to 
deal with language differences. 
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2.7 The role of trust 
Multiple studies on risk and crisis communication, and parallel fields, have shown the 
importance of public trust in agencies responsible for disaster management. Trust increases the 
likelihood that messaging will be understood and believed by the public, and helps increase the 
social acceptance of management options that may reduce risk pre-emptively. 
Raisch and McCaffrey (2019) suggested that trust consists of three interconnected 
components: competence (ability), benevolence (goodwill), and honesty (integrity). With 
specific reference to trust in wildfire agencies, this study pointed out how several factors can 
influence trust including how an agency communicates, inter-agency and public-agency 
relations, public exposure to agencies during wildfire events, experience with prescribed burns, 
and agency values or preferences that are expressed or assumed to play a role in guiding 
management actions. The first three were found to be builders of positive trust whereas all five 
were factors that could negatively affect the building and maintenance of trust.  
Prescribed burning generally led to distrust or a neutral response with 18% of respondents 
believing that such management practices caused wildfires compared to the actual incidence rate 
of 2%. This shows how some individuals remember and magnify negative experiences but forget 
successful actions. This effect is commonly described in a range of psychological and 
sociological literature as the “saliency effect.” Another negative factor that created social conflict 
coincided with the arrival of non-local responders during a wildfire and a perceived lack of 
regular communication from the agency. Generally speaking, rural communities had lower 
overall levels of trust. Rural communities often have less reliance on public services including 
support from fire response agencies. A lack of shared values and differences in forest 
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management preferences also tended to damage trust. Lastly, a perception of poor interagency 
cooperation both prior to and during an incident eroded trust.  
Building trust requires specific conditions and activities. For instance, the public appreciated 
an opportunity to provide input to management plans which gave them a voice and an 
opportunity to express concerns. The frequency and openness of communication was associated 
with expressions of trust. Of note was the finding that respondents in all five communities 
studied by Rasch and McCaffrey (2019) linked trust with positive personal experiences 
interacting with agencies during an incident. This was framed in the context of visibly well-
coordinated efforts that fostered a perception of competence. Participants ranked inter-agency 
cooperation higher than agency-public relationships in terms of gaining trust. The more suburban 
a community, the higher the general trust in wildfire agencies. Trust was most often described 
based on an assessment of ability and competence of the agency. Agencies that were socially and 
geographically embedded in a community, and shared values, had higher levels of trust with the 
community. The ability to demonstrate local knowledge and to recognize public concerns about 
social and ecological conditions was critically important.  
Several recommendations were made to fire agencies resulting from this research. The 
inclusion of local stakeholders in decision-making processes helps build, maintain, and restore 
trust within communities. Daily interactions in a community, not just during a fire, demonstrates 
competence and recognition of local values. When communicating crisis information, such as 
evacuation orders and fire updates, managers need to be sensitive to individual and community 
history. Building an understanding of inter-agency coordination through cross-training also 
strengthens community trust. With respect to prescribed burning, managers need to be 
transparent with the how, when, why, and consequences of the burn plan so that community 
	 43	
members can more willingly accept risks. This messaging should include the historic track 
record, goals, and experience of individuals conducting the fuel management project.  
Raish and McCaffrey (2019) found that trust is singularly positive or negative. Based on the 
five factors stated above, individuals will make up their minds about the credibility of the agency 
and therefore support or reject fuel management and fire response actions. Trust is difficult to 
build and easy to lose, and it is clear that it takes a lot of intentional work for an agency to regain 
trust following a negative incident. 
 
2.8 Lessons from flood risk communication research 
Although wildfire events are unique when compared to other kinds of natural and 
technological hazards, there are lessons that can be learned from an examination of hazards like 
flooding. Both hazard types are increasing in frequency and intensity, are climate-change 
mediated, and unfold over a longer period of time compared to earthquakes, and technological 
disasters like chemical factory explosions or train derailments. 
A study by Rollason et al. (2018) considers risk communication with respect to flooding 
events in the United Kingdom by exploring key points of failure in risk communication 
associated with commonly used models. Alternatives are recommended based on the kind of 
information needed by the public in order to limit the impacts of flooding. A multi-method 
participatory experiment was developed to explore existing perspectives of flood 
communication, and several models were tested on participants. 
 Traditional approaches to risk communication for flooding often involve a hybrid of a 
risk message model (RRM) and a risk information model (RIM) with an emphasis on 
transmitting information about a hazard to activate protective responses. There is an emphasis on 
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infrastructure and supporting property-based resilience. RIM is the translation of hazard 
information into action, and it is influenced by previous experience of a threat, geographical 
factors, socioeconomic and cultural factors, reliance on public protective infrastructure, requires 
higher levels of trust in the management authority, and involves balancing the protection of 
personal security with uncertainty.  
This kind of risk communication is expert led, and it is likely to generate a limited impact on 
driving risk awareness or promoting resilient behaviours. RIM results in low levels of personal 
preparedness and information penetration which is linked to distrust in communication and 
management organizations. It fails to engage stakeholders in dialogue, and is sometimes 
interpreted as elitist, top-down, and unduly narrow in terms of the topics and issues allowed 
into the conversation. It is clear that this approach of centralizing and professionalizing public 
consultation has generated a disconnect between agencies tasked with communicating and 
managing risk and members of the public. Rollason et al. (2018) noted that this could also 
explain several of the commonly expressed reasons why the public fails to follow fully the 
messaging associated with advisories. More specifically, these reasons included the following: 
(1) A perception that risk managers inflate the protective value of infrastructure-based 
interventions without fully acknowledging limitations. 
(2) A lack of trust in the agencies communicating on the hazard. 
(3)  Relative severity of the risk not communicated which results in the absence of a point 
of reference to compare with previous events. 
(4) The paradox of the “prison of experience,” where infrequent, less severe incidents 
become the yardstick for developing expectations for future events. 
A more robust and effective risk communication model must be more engaging, interactive, and 
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able to activate appropriate and timely responses. It must also be sensitive to the need to 
incorporate local knowledge and experience.  
Rollason et al. (2018) were able to produce a series of models to be tested, and used flood 
risk mapping based on GIS software to run two-dimensional flood models. Participants showed 
more interest in active communication, particularly with real-time maps of river levels. By 
expressing their frustration regarding the absence of forecasting of river levels, study participants 
showed a strong preference to have more information presented in models to aid in decision-
making. Developing flood or other kinds of hazard literacy can be done through active and 
passive communication. Active modes are more effective because they allow individuals to make 
informed decisions themselves rather than relying entirely on experts. Since expert knowledge is 
often incomplete and subject to uncertainty, a balance must be struck between using such 
knowledge and other competing sources. Users assess their risk tolerance and determine the 
timing and severity of the hazard. They can initiate appropriate risk mitigation measures to 
reduce exposure to the hazard. It is clear that a need exists to understand the risk so that 
individuals can feel in control of their decisions and respond appropriately.  
 Risk communication should provide more detailed, holistic hazard-based information. 
This can improve local “flood literacy” by building an understanding of flood dynamics and 
vulnerabilities. Affected members of the public are then able to examine their personal levels of 
risk exposure and to define suitable actions to limit these effects by increasing capacity to 
respond. 
It was demonstrated that protection motivation theory (PMT) as well as a participatory 
approach were the most effective risk communication models. PMT outlines the contrasting 
variables which contribute to triggering behavioural responses from risk information. An 
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individual’s actions are based on the severity and likelihood of hazard exposure relative to the 
potential effectiveness of embracing specific protective actions. PMT shows the complex, 
contested, and highly personal nature of the relationship between risk communication and 
behavior mobilization. The participatory approach is democratic in that it treats everyone as 
equals with respect to determining a course of action. By including many voices, including 
outliers, better decisions can often be made to reflect the values, needs, and expectations of a 
community.  PMT was shown to be a useful tool to raise awareness and to communicate 
complex hazard information. 
The study also found that timely warnings are the only way to reduce the impact on 
mental health from a natural disaster. Clear, comprehensive communication prior and during an 
incident is critical to reduce impacts, and to improve community well-being. Resilience and 
participation in risk communication are based on trust, co-production of solutions, and the 
development and ongoing support of relationships. 
 
2.9 Lessons from tsunami evacuation research 
Tsunamis, wildfires, and floods all represent hazards that have the potential to generate 
catastrophic consequences. These hazard types threaten infrastructure, expose communities to 
risk, and “stress test” emergency response systems and associated risk and crisis communication 
practices. Makinoshima, Imamura and Oishi (2020) examined 22 tsunami-related events 
occurring between 1960 and 2018, and developed a framework to show how behavioural and 
physical processes are related to preparedness. They relied primarily on academic articles and 
reports that had an emphasis on notifications and evacuation processes.  
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 The evacuation process itself consists of a response phase and an evacuation movement 
phase. Three notification types include early, mid, and late stages. Early stage notifications tend 
to occur once seismic activity is detected. Threat assessments and modelling are done to provide 
early alerts. Mid stage notifications rely heavily on social cues including modelling of behaviour 
and tapping into personal networks to communicate risk-based information. Late-stage 
notifications are generated when physical signs of a tsunami are recognized including nearshore 
waves and unusual sounds.  
From this research, it is clear that risk and crisis communication depend heavily on the 
kind of information available, interpretation of social and physical cues, as well as how this is 
translated by traditional broadcast media and social media through various channels. As with 
other hazard types, local context and different kinds of backgrounds of affected individuals 
determine responses. Tsunamis, wildfires, and floods all require responses attuned to both the 
magnitude of the threat and also the speed at which it develops. Unlike wildfires and floods, the 
underlying processes of threat generation are mostly hidden, and prediction of future seismic 
activity is challenging.  
In another study on earthquakes and tsunamis, Gaillard et al. (2008) reflected on how 
responses by different ethnic groups varied based on the existence of a disaster sub-culture and 
more general cultural, economic and political factors. McAdoo et al. (2006) examined 
differences in mortality data and discussed the importance of using Indigenous knowledge and 
past experience to reduce losses associated with future tsunamis events. For example, a 1983 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan led to 72.4% of people studied in Okushiri to learn lessons from 
the past that prepared them for future hazards. Another study by Ushiyama and Atsuo (2010) 
explored the intention to evacuate following a 2010 Chilean tsunami by posing several questions 
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related to forecasting and modelling based on the predicted height of waves. This study showed 
that tsunami forecasts had the potential to create non-adaptive responses where some individuals 
misinterpreted this information and could return to their homes prematurely. Harnantyari et al. 
(2020) showed that 95% of respondents begin evacuation preparations immediately when 





















3.1 Consultations with stakeholders in British Columbia 
Between June 16, 2020 and January 26, 2021, seven virtual consultations using a 
videoconferencing platform were conducted with a wide range of organizations involved in 
wildfire risk communication. The primary focus of this study was on the interior of the Province 
of British Columbia, and a combination of purposive and “snowball” sampling was used to 
identify organizations to participate. Participating organizations were: 
BC Wildfire Service 
Emergency Management BC 
First Nations’ Emergency Services Society 
Simpcw First Nations 
City of Kamloops 
Thompson-Nicola Regional District 
PreparedBC and Emergency Info BC 
 
3.2 Anticipated outcomes from participants in this study 
 Since a significant proportion of the funding for this project came from a grant to 
Thompson Rivers University from the BC Wildfire Service, participants from that organization 
were asked how this research could be of value. It was clear that the BC Wildfire Service is 
interested in understanding more fully how and what to communicate during a crisis. Providing 
the public and other stakeholders with timely and accurate information is paramount to them, and 
lessons learned from provincial wildfire events in 2017 and 2018 in particular reinforced the 
need to use other approaches for communication including social media.  
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 The BC Wildfire Service emphasized how their communication practices have evolved in 
recent years, and they clearly showed an interest in shifting away from a “conservative” or 
traditional approach to risk and crisis communication to a more holistic and responsive system. 
A noteworthy change occurred with the introduction of information officers located in at-risk 
communities who could play multiple roles including liaising with local governments, the media, 
and others. Given that the public has an interest in accessing detailed and timely information, it is 
clear that the BC Wildfire Service can inspire greater degrees of trust through transparency. A 
fine balance exists between providing information and generating a fear response in 
communities, and the BC Wildfire Service is keenly interested in exploring new models of risk 
and crisis communication that allow them to modernize their approach, decrease risk, ensure 
more cooperation and coordination, and to shift from simply providing information to building a 
more sophisticated risk-based approach. 
 
3.3 Differences between risk and crisis communication 
The terms risk communication and crisis communication are often used interchangeably. 
There are differences conceptually and in practice between these approaches that require 
explanation and nuancing. 
 The BC Wildfire Service views risk communication as a process that occurs prior to a 
wildfire event. Effective risk communication should help prevent wildfires through proactive 
communication on risk factors, and to increase the level of understanding that the public and 
other actors have with respect to mitigating risks. This can increase community resilience, and it 
is based on principles found in programs like FireSmart and the use of prescribed burning to 
reduce fuel loads. 
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By contrast, crisis communication occurs during an event, and it involves communicating 
risk information including the suitability of options that can act as safeguards to intervene 
between the hazard and human life, property, and infrastructure.  
The BC Wildfire Service emphasized the importance of focusing on risk communication 
as a tool to reduce the need to shift into a crisis communication mode. They are interested in 
developing new models and predictive approaches that can assist in educating stakeholders on 
how to interpret fire danger ratings and to understand how fast a fire moves based on rate of 
spread, fire intensity, fuel load, biophysical factors, etc. Models like this are complex, 
multifactorial, and mathematical in nature. These tools can be a valuable adjunct to effective 
crisis and risk communication given that the interactions explored allow for predictions to be 
based on both historical and emergent data. Clearly, a challenge exists with respect to explaining 
complex information to stakeholders so that appropriate responses are activated. 
 
3.4 Use of the incident command system by study participants 
As previously discussed, the Incident Command System is the foundation for the BC 
Emergency Management System (BCEMS). The Incident Command System (ICS) emerged 
from the ashes of the 1970 California wildfires that, in 13 days, killed 16 people, destroyed 772 
structures, burned over 500,000 hectares, and cost $233 million USD. In its review of the fires, 
the U.S. Forest Service learned that at the incident or field level, there was confusion derived 
from different terminology, organizational structure, and operating procedures between the 
various response agencies, and at the agency level, the mechanisms to coordinate and manage 
competing resource demands and to establish consistent resource priorities was inadequate. 
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British Columbia was the first Canadian jurisdiction to adopt ICS in the mid-1990s, 
followed by the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre (CIFFC). In 2002, the CIFFC 
‘Canadianized’ the U.S.-based ICS materials to improve on-site incident efficiency, improve 
interoperability for mutual aid, and enhance firefighter safety. All provincial, territorial, and 
federal wildland firefighting agencies across Canada have subsequently adopted this ICS model 
(ICS/IMS Canada – Communiqué, 2015). 
The Government of B.C. views the British Columbia Emergency Management System 
(BCEMS) as a standard system for emergency response. The BCEMS is currently mandated for 
use within the Government of B.C. and is recommended to local authorities. According to the 
British Columbia Emergency Management System Manual (Government of British Columbia 
2016), the BCEMS utilizes the structure and fundamentals of the Incident Command System. 
The guiding principles, among others, of the BCEMS include collaboration and stakeholder 
engagement, and clear communication. Stakeholders are expected to collaborate in pursuing an 
integrated and unified approach to emergency management and to have open lines of 
communication with each other. Valid and accurate information is to be clearly communicated to 
stakeholders in a timely manner and this includes messaging before, during, and after an 
emergency. 
The British Columbia Emergency Management System Manual (Government of British 
Columbia 2016, p. 77) defines communication and information management as “an organized, 
integrated, and coordinated mechanism to ensure the accurate, consistent, and timely delivery of 
information to site level responders, assisting and cooperating agencies, site support personnel, 
and the public/stakeholders.” 
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Regarding emergency preparedness and public education before there is an emergency, 
BCEMS’s goals are to empower the members of a community or organization to understand 
risks and hazards, prepare them for an emergency/disaster, participate meaningfully in 
emergency management initiatives, and develop the skills they need to mitigate their personal 
risk. 
Examples of public/stakeholder awareness and education programs listed in the BCEMS 
Manual include information campaigns through television and radio, internet and social media, 
brochures and posters, information booths, specialized awareness campaigns like Emergency 
Preparedness Week or Tsunami Awareness Week, workshops and public forums, and 
community exercises/drills. 
Regarding response operations, the goals of communication and information management are 
to: 
- Standardize key information so that it can be accessed easily within and across 
organizations. 
- Establish a process that promotes the regular sharing of information with other response 
organizations. 
- Link the operational and support elements within and across various organizations. 
- Provide a common operating picture and situational awareness for response personnel 
and organizations. 
- Maximize the use of readily available resources, including the Internet and web-based 
tools. 
- Ensure the secure management and timely release of sensitive information. 
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- Ensure the release of credible and accurate information to the public and other 
stakeholders. 
The BCEMS acknowledges that during operations, accurate information must be disseminated in 
a consistent, coordinated, accessible, and timely manner. The BCEMS notes that establishing a 
joint information centre/system (JIC/JIS) may be of help in this regard as it is designed to 
coordinate incident information provided by multiple agencies and integrate the data into a 
cohesive whole. It also recognizes that traditional media and social media play a critical role in 
the response phase. 
Representatives from the B.C. Wildfire Service, Emergency Management BC, Simpcw 
First Nation, First Nations’ Emergency Services Society, the City of Kamloops and the 
Thompson-Nicola Regional District were asked about their use of the Incident Command System 
and their approach to crisis communication. Their responses are summarized and synthesized 
below. 
The BC Wildfire Service (BCWS) was resolute about their use of the ICS. For example, a 
BC Wildfire Service workbook, S-230 (BC) Introduction to Supervision – Trainee Workbook 
(Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations and 
Rural Development 2019) unequivocally states that every wildfire in British Columbia is 
organized using the principles of ICS. This position was reinforced in the consultation.  
Regarding crisis communications, the BCWS representatives said that they use as many 
communications channels, from AM radio to Twitter, as possible. They use the BCWS website 
for internet-based communications and also use Facebook. They engage with local media first, 
then regional, national and international media. There were concerns raised about the 
effectiveness of the media in communicating essential information and that there is room for 
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improvement in that relationship. Public forums were found to be challenging and not their 
preferred way to communicate with communities. 
It was opined that the public does not always believe what the BCWS says and that 
sometimes misstatements concerning the status of a fire are released to the public by local 
Emergency Operations Centre communications officers. The value of both preventative risk and 
crisis communications and communications during response operations were appreciated and a 
willingness to improve in these areas was acknowledged. Similarly, the need for structured, 
consistent and clear communications among participating agencies was recognized.  
Emergency Management BC, as the province's lead coordinating agency for all 
emergency management activities, including response, planning, training, testing and exercising, 
uses the British Columbia Emergency Management System (BCEMS) and ICS. Emergency 
Management BC (EMBC) collaborates with local governments, First Nations, federal 
departments, industry, non-government organizations and volunteers. 
It was opined that a challenge of ICS is that it was designed for an on-site management 
structure but does not inherently account for remote regional support systems such as those 
offered by EMBC. The communication channels used by EMBC, as a coordinating agency rather 
than a response agency, and stakeholders rather than the public will be examined.   
Many platforms, including Skype, MS Teams and Bluejeans, are used for video-
conferencing. Skype is currently preferred for internal government communications and large-
scale coordination communications. It was acknowledged that many remote First Nations and 
Northern communities do not have internet or reliable internet or cellular service. This poses 
communications challenges with these communities.  
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The default back-up is amateur radio. Through the Provincial Emergency Radio 
Communications Service (PERCS), EMBC is linked with hundreds of volunteer amateur radio 
operators who are available to assist with communications in the event of an emergency. 
Licensed volunteer amateur radio operators are affiliated with their local government’s 
emergency management programs. Some even supply their own equipment. PERCS volunteers 
train regularly and often take part in emergency exercises, so they are prepared for any crisis 
situation that arises. 
In the event of an emergency, EMBC communicates with all affected stakeholders. 
EMBC maintains a list that is updated at biannual workshops hosted by EMBC. Jurisdictional 
issues of who is in charge is resolved through coordination calls. Advance planning at the 
biannual meetings is used to predetermine the level of responsibility of each agency before the 
incident. There is sometimes a challenge in knowing who to talk to in First Nations, whether it is 
the elected Chief, hereditary Chief or the Band Manager.  
Simpcw First Nation representatives noted that the Incident Command System is used in 
the running of Emergency Operations Centres (EOC). The function of an EOC, according to 
Emergency Operations Centre Operational Guidelines, 2nd Edition (Justice Institute of British 
Columbia – Emergency Management Division, and Emergency Management BC) is to provide 
overall jurisdictional direction and control, coordination and resource support. ICS is also used to 
manage large events. 
While ICS is trusted by Simpcw First Nation, there are some challenges in its application. 
In particular, it was mentioned that the ICS concepts of span of control and chain of command do 
not strictly fit within Simpcw First Nation. The Chief’s role in the IOC is as the Public 
Information Officer. The Chief and Band Council are informed and kept in-the-loop during an 
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emergency. The Chief and Band Council have adopted ICS in the Simpcw First Nation’s 
emergency plan.  
Concerning crisis communications, Simpcw First Nation uses a myriad of 
communication channels ranging from Facebook (e.g., for a fast-moving incident like a missing 
person) to e-mails and press releases for longer and larger incidents. In terms of emergency 
preparedness, they also hold a health and safety fair. The importance of building trust within the 
community and starting small and building bigger was acknowledged. 
The City of Kamloops uses the Incident Command System. Many staff are trained in 
their roles and responsibilities in the City’s Emergency Operations Centre. Due to the emphasis 
on pre-planning and operational readiness, the City has multiple levels of redundancy and 
capacity.  
Regarding crisis communications, the City of Kamloops utilizes an array of channels. 
They range from social media including Facebook and Twitter, to TV and radio, and an 
interactive emergency map on the City’s website are all communications channels used by the 
City of Kamloops. In terms of preventative work, staff from the City knock on every single door 
in high-risk zones to educate people face-to-face to FireSmart their properties.  
The Thompson-Nicola Regional District (TNRD) Emergency Services program provides 
the direction and coordination required to respond and recover from major emergencies or 
disasters, like wildfires and floods, in the rural areas of the region. The program is in place to 
assist Incident Commanders when emergencies exceed their response capabilities, training or 
available resources.  
In an emergency, the TNRD may activate an Emergency Operations Centre. Its EOC is 
based on the British Columbia Emergency Management System which utilizes the Incident 
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Command System. There are 20-25 TNRD staff trained to work in the EOC, including a few 
who can work as the Public Information Officer (PIO). These PIOs are trained to not 
communicate or paraphrase any information from any other agency. The TNRD does link or 
share other agencies’ posts to increase reach without misleading people as to the origin of the 
information.   
The communications channels used by the TNRD include a fulsome website with a lot of 
preparatory information as opposed to what to do after there is a fire, a web-based mapping 
system that shows fire boundaries and any alert or order areas, signage, preventative programs 
like FireSmart, Twitter, Facebook and Facebook live streaming.  
It was admitted that many remote communities do not have internet or reliable internet or 
cellular service. Some rural communities do not have access to a local newspaper and do not get 
CBC or NL radio. This poses communications challenges with these communities. There is not a 
lot of engagement with residents through Twitter. Most social media is done through Facebook, 
including community group pages.   
Communications between the TNRD and First Nations is sometimes challenging. Best 
efforts are made to coordinate decision-making and messaging together. Each level of 
government issues their own alerts and orders, which are sometimes different for lands which are 
nearby one another.  
The mission of First Nations’ Emergency Services Society (FNESS) is to assist First 
Nations in developing and sustaining safer and healthier communities through programs such as 
those that focus on forest fuel management and emergency management. The Forest Fuel 
Management (FFM) Department works with First Nations communities, and provincial and 
federal governments, and agencies, to assist First Nations with wildfire prevention activities. 
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FFM supports access to funding to communities through planning, education, and 
implementation of wildfire threat reduction activities. FNESS works closely with First Nation 
communities, Emergency Management BC (EMBC), Indigenous Services Canada and various 
other stakeholders to support the successful implementation of emergency management for First 
Nation communities in BC.  
As the role of FNESS is to assist and support First Nations in their efforts to build safer 
communities, their output is evidenced in the operational readiness of First Nation communities. 
FNESS is not itself operational and so does not use the British Columbia Emergency 
Management System and Incident Command System in its work but helps First Nation 
communities with wildfire prevention activities and emergency management guidance and 
support. 
PreparedBC is an arm of Emergency Management BC. Emergency management in 
British Columbia is guided by four pillars: mitigation, preparation, response and recovery. The 
goals of the B.C. Emergency Management System are to empower the members of a community 
or organization to understand risks and hazards, prepare them for an emergency/disaster, 
participate meaningfully in emergency management initiatives, and develop the skills they need 
to mitigate their personal risk. The BCEMS notes many ways of educating the public and 
stakeholders including information campaigns through television and radio, internet and social 
media, brochures and posters, information booths, specialized awareness campaigns like 
Emergency Preparedness Week or Tsunami Awareness Week, workshops and public forums, 
and community exercises/drills.   
In this light, PreparedBC helps British Columbians prepare for hazards which not only 
include wildfires but floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and hazardous material spills. Its website is 
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user-friendly and easy to navigate. Viewers are invited to “Get prepared for wildfires” or told 
that “It’s time to be Flood Ready!” These headings are not merely technical labels but calls for 
people to act and to do something in advance of the hazard manifesting. There is a concerted 
effort to not only educate people about the hazards of wildfire, for example, but what people 
should do to reduce their exposure to risk before there is even a wildfire burning.  
The wildfire section is broken down into three sub-sections: Before a Wildfire, During a 
Wildfire, and After a Wildfire. The Before a Wildfire sub-section has six tips which include how 
people should prepare their home and make an emergency plan. Before a Flood also has three 
sub-sections on what to do before, during and after a flood and has four tips which include how 
people should protect their home and to make an emergency plan as well.  
PreparedBC is attempting to prophylactically reduce the risk exposure to wildfire by 
changing people’s behaviour before the hazard is present. Other agencies deal with fighting the 
fire or responding and reacting to other hazards like earthquakes or floods. PreparedBC, 
however, deals with hazards proactively by educating people on ways not to reduce the 
likelihood or severity of a hazard occurring but of that hazard becoming a disaster because of its 
affect or impact on people.  
Its website is one way that PreparedBC seeks to educate and prepare people. It has also 
published a 20-page “Wildfire Preparedness Guide” and it has a strong social media presence 
with 30,100 followers on Twitter and is followed by 5,000 people on Facebook. It is interesting 
though that Emergency Info BC’s Twitter account has more than five times as many followers 




3.5 Gaps in communication – Internal and external stakeholders 
 Effective risk and crisis communication require identifying and closing gaps that exist 
between emergency response organizations and stakeholders. Such communication is dynamic in 
nature, and it involves consultation, information sharing, building understanding, trust, and 
mobilizing appropriate risk mitigation responses. Poor communication may increase risk and 
leads to loss of life and property. It can also disrupt local economies and have long lasting effects 
on communities and individuals including on mental health. 
 According to Albris, Lauta, and Raju (2020), there are three kinds of knowledge gaps 
commonly seen in disaster risk reduction approaches: epistemological, institutional, and 
strategic. Epistemological gaps occur when different interests and worldviews intervene to 
influence how knowledge and information are interpreted. This can be most pronounced when 
examining differences between experts based on discipline, institution type, and experience. It is 
seen mostly when exploring gaps and challenges associated with internal, inter-agency 
communication, or between agencies and other branches of government. Epistemological gaps 
can also exist when external communication occurs between agencies and the public. 
 Institutional gaps are associated with differences in governance and are more embedded 
within internal communication. For instance, barriers to the integration of science and first-hand 
experience into policy invariably exist, and this can have implications for risk reduction 
including the effective deployment of new strategies and technologies needed by emergency 
response organizations.  
 Strategic gaps emerge when a lack of common vision on how to move forward exists. 
These gaps can be found in both internal and external communications. A strategic gap refers to 
a lack of common vision on how to progress. Albris, Lauta, and Raju (2020) noted that locus of 
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concern also plays a role in that the integration of knowledge transfer when dealing with local 
disasters tends to occur in a sectorial fashion instead of in cross or multi-sectional ways. To 
make matters more challenging, there is poor or non-existent communication between experts 
and the general public, and multiples studies spanning decades on risk perception and 
communication show a strong and persistent disconnection between expert and public 
assessments of risk. 
 Comprehensively identifying stakeholders is essential for the BC Wildfire Service to 
communicate effectively both internally and externally. Building and maintaining trust is a 
challenge given the wide range of stakeholder types that are engaged, and ultimately trust is 
associated with successful mobilization of individuals and organizations. Part of this engagement 
involves understanding the type and amount of information that different stakeholders require. 
As the public begins to develop an understanding of wildfire hazards based on direct and indirect 
experiences, the amount of information requested appears to be increasing, and the BC Wildfire 
Service is attempting to address this gap by developing a deeper understanding of how to best 
communicate this information.  
The BC Wildfire Service is interested in understanding how the daily cycle of 
information during a wildfire event changes over time and space, and currently uses information 
officers in affected communities to liaise with a range of internal and external stakeholders. This 
approach is likely to generate more trust and engender proactive fire protective behaviours to 
mitigate risk, but it does come with some challenges. Timely and frequent updates can lead to an 
increased expectation for even more granularity and detail. With operational issues being 
paramount, this can create tension between the BC Wildfire Service and stakeholders who may 
want specific information that cannot be provided at the time. Furthermore, highly specific 
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information relating to individual properties is difficult to provide given the constantly changing 
nature of wildfire events and the availability or resources, communication between firefighters 
and emergency operations centres, etc.  
 For Emergency Management BC, a distinction is made between external and internal 
stakeholders for communication purposes. When communicating externally, there is an emphasis 
on facts and what is known to be true at the time. This is important since they are speaking on 
behalf of the Province and stakeholders rely on their work. By contrast, internal communication 
is more nuanced and recognizes the fluidity of emergencies. Such communications can be 
characterized as dialogical where freedom to discuss and debate possible scenarios and outcomes 
is encouraged. This reflects the culture of Emergency Management BC and their reliance on 
advice from specialist partners and experts for managing risks. 
Communication gaps also exist and they tend to be concentrated around getting 
information to those who require it. Additionally, it is difficult for them to know if this 
information is understood. This requires the use of non-technical language for communications 
with external stakeholders. For communications with internal stakeholders and partners like the 
BC Wildfire Service, local governments, First Nations, and others, coordination calls are held to 
review and discuss operational details including evacuation orders. These calls are scheduled and 
organized by EMBC. This kind of communication was defined by Emergency Management BC 
as “tight” and deemed essential before information is provided to the general public. One major 
issue identified by Emergency Management BC is staff turnover within local governments and 
partners in smaller communities. High turnover rates make it more difficult to build and maintain 
relationships, result in lower levels of experience, and create some basic logistical challenges 
associated with having to find new contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses, etc.  
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As noted previously, the mission of the First Nations’ Emergency Services Society is to 
assist First Nations to become safer and healthier communities by providing fire services, fuel 
management, and emergency management to members. They face many challenges with respect 
to risk and crisis communication, and gaps exist when dealing with both internal and external 
stakeholders although they do not formally distinguish between the two stakeholder types. 
 Both internal and external communication are constrained by access to technology, and 
there is still a reliance on facsimile equipment to send and receive information to 125 band 
offices. There is also a lower penetration rate of computers, internet connectivity, and cellular 
telephones in many of the more remote communities. It was noted that partners sometimes had to 
drive to “hot spots” outside of homes and offices in order to send and receive cellular calls and 
messages including email. There is also a serious challenge with respect to turnover of contacts 
in these communities making continuity of communication more difficult while slowing down 
response times. It was noted that a preference for paper-based approaches still exists in many of 
these communities, and face-to-face meetings are important given the culture and a need to 
cultivate and maintain trust. 
 With a territory covering approximately 5,000,000 ha, the Simpcw First Nation is 
confronted regularly with hazards like wildfires and flooding that require a coordinated 
approach. They also have processes and practices in place for managing lost person incidents 
within their extensive and geographically diverse territory. EMBC is involved in search and 
rescue operations in First Nations lands. Their emergency operations centre communicates 
internally with Emergency Management BC, and this is designed to foster an open process for 
the purpose of coordinating multi-jurisdictional responses. External stakeholders include the BC 
Wildfire Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, local fire departments, and municipalities 
	 65	
including Clearwater and Barriere. Other First Nations’ communities are sometimes involved, 
and the Simpcw First Nation appears to have a particularly strong relationship with Trans 
Mountain Corporation who assist in search and rescue operations and other tasks. For external 
stakeholders, communication falls mostly on an Information Officer working within the 
Emergency Operations Centre. There are direct connections between the Chief and Band Council 
with this individual and others who play supporting roles. 
 For the Simpcw First Nations, staffing turnover in key emergency management roles has 
been kept to a minimum, and they have experienced individuals in place. They also have an 
emergency communications plan which may be useful as a model by other communities along 
the Trans Mountain pipeline route in particular.  
 When communicating with external stakeholders, the Simpcw First Nations use 
previously collected email addresses from local businesses and other stakeholders, and they have 
a social media presence through Facebook. Contact databases are updated annually. Regular 
communication is conducted with their Chief and Council, and an effort to iteratively refine their 
emergency communications plan is evident, and they actively seek out feedback from 
Emergency Management BC and other partners. Being open to change allows this community to 
learn from incidents, and fire fighters and other emergency responders benefit from ongoing 
training.  
 When access to wireless or mobile networks is available, internal communication 
involves the use of the mobile app WhatsApp. This allows the Simpcw First Nations’ team to 
text each other seamlessly and it supports the sharing of multimedia files including video. 
Another app is used to send messages through radios when in the field and outside of these 
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networks. For the Simpcw First Nations, this improves response time and allows for a more 
dynamic approach for managing emergency response. 
 When a wildfire is detected, the City of Kamloops uses a tactical approach for 
communicating with potentially affected individuals. Once the scope of a wildfire is understood, 
“ground truthing” through in situ observation is used to verify facts, and a premium is placed on 
explaining what is known and unknown at that moment in time.  
 For communicating with external stakeholders including the general public, social media 
like Twitter and Facebook is used extensively. More traditional media including radio and 
television are also used. This allows the City of Kamloops to provide high quality updates in 
close to real-time. Using GIS software, the City’s emergency response centre can quickly 
identify properties at-risk, and individuals are encouraged to register with emergency support 
services. If evacuation is imminent, door-to-door notifications are also used to make sure that 
everyone in an affected area is apprised of the situation.  
 The focus for both internal and external communications is on quality information. The 
City of Kamloops views this as their responsibility since they are the local authority in the 
municipality. They work closely with the BC Wildfire Service and have what they deem as a 
“high quality” emergency operations centre where stakeholders are assumed to understand their 
roles and responsibilities and to work in a coordinated fashion. 
 One notable gap in communication is the challenge associated with knowing if risk-based 
messaging reaches intended audiences. There was also a strong desire from the City of 
Kamloops to have access to a provincial mass notification system based on cellular technology 
where their emergency operations centre can push out text messages to individuals in geofenced 
regions. This approach is commonly used for marketing purposes to collect information and to 
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serve customized messages to consumers as they enter, leave or stay within a geographical area. 
The value of this technology for reaching large audiences where cellular technology penetration 
rates are high is indispensable in emergencies. 
 The Thompson-Nicola Regional District encompasses close to 45,000 square kilometres 
in the southern interior of the province. With a highly variable geography made up of deserts, 
valleys, mountains, and grasslands, this part of British Columbia is frequently exposed to hazards 
like wildfires and flooding events. In 2017, many parts of the District experienced significant 
flooding events with a state of emergency declared south of Merritt in May of that year. This was 
soon followed by the worst wildfire season in recent history.  
 Prior to 2017, the Thompson-Nicola Regional District relied primarily on traditional 
media to communicate with external stakeholders. This worked relatively well in urban 
communities who were served by local content providers. In rural communities, shortcomings 
became quickly evident, and social media and other forms of Internet-mediated communications 
were preferable.  
 The use of Facebook and other platforms requires careful reflection and significant 
investment in one-to-many and one-to-one communication through services like Facebook and 
Messenger where it was noted that Thompson-Nicola Regional District staff engaged in 
extensive personal messaging with residents during wildfire events. The rise of misinformation 
and disinformation in social media also presents unique challenges, and there is a need to 
carefully engage in dialogue to reduce anxiety while providing useful information. One 
challenge noted involved working with communities and other partners to move livestock from 
areas at-risk.  
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 Reflecting on wildfires in 2017, the Thompson-Nicola Regional District participants 
highlighted the important of inter-agency cooperation and coordination. This is especially 
important during evacuations, and communication with local governments and the BC Wildfire 
Service was characterized in a positive manner.  
 In 2019, the Thompson-Nicola Regional District invested in an emergency alert 
notification system that allowed them to communicate with the general public through email and 
text messaging. The use of this technology increases the probability that the right people are 
reached during an emergency, and it works well when combined with other approaches including 
the use of social media.  
 With respect to gaps in communication, the largest obstacle identified is how to 
effectively reach individuals living in rural and sometimes remote locations. With a decline in 
newspaper readership, and the invariable delays associated with communicating information to 
the general public through this medium, digital communication is the best option. When 
communicating internally with other agencies, a daily call between stakeholders is common 
practice. This can sometimes generate delays in sharing information in a real-time fashion to 
reflect the speed at which wildfires can move. When evacuation is required, these delays can be 
problematic, and it was noted that evacuation orders have been issued in the past after local 
police had already began the process as part of their tactical assessment work. More often than 
not, evacuations would happen before the Regional Coordination Centre even knew of the 
situation and had an opportunity to notify Emergency Management BC and local government. 
This can be exacerbated given the bureaucratic channels that need to be followed including sign 
off on evacuation orders from the B.C. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. 
In mid-June of 2021, the District introduced a searchable online map that provides real-time data 
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on wildfire and flood events while including details on evacuation status 
(https://www.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/5815bca37239492c98e4324daf5f955d). 
 PreparedBC and Emergency Info BC fall under the Emergency Management BC 
umbrella. PreparedBC focuses primarily on education and works to build resiliency by helping 
individuals and communities prepare for emergencies. It is described on their website as a “one-
stop shop for disaster readiness information.” By contrast, Emergency Info BC works with 
information during an emergency to ensure that accurate information is communicated as quickly 
and transparently as possible. This organization uses social media extensively to share official 
response and recovery information from trusted partners, and on Twitter they had approximately 
169,000 followers as of June 6, 2021. It is important to note that neither organization uses paid 
advertising, and the use of print media is limited. 
 The primary target for communication for both PreparedBC and Emergency Info BC is 
the general public. These external stakeholders receive information that is amplified by these 
organizations. For instance, during a wildfire event Emergency Info BC will use their platforms 
to share details from the BC Wildfire Service and others. One of their main roles is to point 
individuals towards credible sources of information. To sharpen their skills, tabletop exercises 
are conducted periodically to verify that Emergency Info BC is capturing and communicating 
information from partners accurately and quickly. This can be a challenge given how there are 
now many competing sources of information available on the Internet. One issue that requires 
more exploration in future research is how a reliance on digital technology for emergency 
communication creates unique vulnerabilities flowing from disasters as well as cybersecurity 
threats that can disrupt electrical, cellular, and broadband infrastructure on a large scale. 
 
	 70	
3.6 Managing jurisdiction  
Wildfire is complex and adding to this complexity is that fires may impact multiple land 
jurisdictions and involve various levels of government as well as other organizations. A study by 
Nowell et al. (2020) found that in the U.S. fires generally impacted three or more land 
jurisdictions representing multiple levels of government but larger, more complex fires could 
have up to 13 different land management jurisdictions. They noted that there were multiple tools 
within the Incident Command System to help allow for organizations to govern across 
jurisdictions but also pointed out the increasing complexity of these challenges and the capacity 
issues experienced with larger fires. Therefore, it is important to understand how organizations 
deal with jurisdictional issues and communication with other organizations. 
For the BC Wildfire Service (BCWS) there can be unique challenges with jurisdictional 
issues in terms of communication with other organizations and specifically how the media may 
relay this information. It is important that the local information officer provide accurate 
information that supports the community or communities in need. Areas for improvement 
include addressing gaps with local government communications staff and continuing to improve 
communication internally with EMBC. A common challenge is that people often do not 
understand how the cycle of information in a fire situation works and have expectations, such as 
minute by minute updates, which are not realistic. 
Emergency Management BC’s (EMBC) approach to jurisdictional issues and 
communication across multiple organizations is to err on the side of caution and to make sure 
that all parties receive the information they need. First Nations are advised of events on their 
traditional territories even though they might not have formal jurisdiction on a map. 
Jurisdictional issues can be addressed through coordination calls, using resources such as the 
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Office of the Fire Commissioner (OFC) to liaise between multiple groups, and before an incident 
occurs EMBC uses advanced planning at their biannual meetings to predetermine the 
responsibility of different organizations. However, challenges exist. One issue is that when 
people are evacuated, they are generally moved to another jurisdiction and challenges arise over 
whose responsibility they now fall under and whether this is communicated effectively to them. 
These challenges dealing with communication and public expectations can lead to issues mid (or 
intra) event and after the event. 
Preplanning and building relationships are important first steps in dealing with 
communications related to jurisdictional issues. The Simpcw First Nation finds that 
communication problems in relation to jurisdictional issues are best addressed through pre-
planning and actively engaging partners prior to an incident. For example, their fire department 
has a mutual aid agreement in place with the District of Barriere with all of the response 
information already in place and planning completed with the TNRD and BCWS. After an 
incident, they debrief to determine ways to address issues. Prepared BC also addresses 
jurisdictional issues by working in advance to build inter-jurisdictional relationships. Every 
jurisdiction has an important role to play in terms of communication during a crisis, and building 
relationships where everyone talks to each other in advance, is key to reducing issues when an 
incident occurs. The City of Kamloops takes a similar approach to ensuring that everyone is 
receiving the correct information by building active relationships with stakeholders. 
Other challenges such as communication infrastructure and ownership of information 
impact jurisdictional issues and communications across organizations. For example, First 
Nations Emergency Services Society (FNESS) notes that a major limitation they face is that 
many of the communities that they work with do not have adequate connectivity. Many First 
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Nations communities do not have radios that will allow for easy communication and this 
transition needs to occur to make information accessible in case of an emergency. A challenge 
the City of Kamloops faces is that not everyone has access to information in an online format so 
this needs to be considered as well. The Thompson Nicola Regional District stressed the 
importance of clearly identifying ownership of information when communicating across 
jurisdictions. For their part, they train all information officers in the TNRD Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) to make sure that information shared is clearly linked to the agency or 
organization that supplies it. This helps to increase the number of people that information can 
reach but keeps it clear on the source of that information. 
  
3.7 Use of forecasting as a tool 
Forecasting, the prediction of future events, is used in risk communication to warn people 
in advance of possible events such as floods or fires. Provincial organizations such as BCWS and 
the BC River Forecast Centre generate this information which is then shared to other 
organizations and the public. In Canada, the Canadian Forest Fire Danger Rating System is used 
to rate the risk of potential for forest fires by assessing factors such as ease of ignition and 
difficulty of control. One of the modules of the CFFDRS is the Fire Weather Index system (FWI) 
which allows for predictive modelling of relative fire potential using weather data which is 
generated daily over the course of the fire season. BCWS predictive services unit also develops 
monthly outlooks over the fire season. This information is used internally but is also shared with 
the public using various online sites. The BC River Forecast Centre is responsible for analyzing 
data related to flood risk and supplying this to emergency managers and the public. 
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               EMBC is the lead agency in BC for all the disaster management and through 
Emergency Info BC their role is to supply the public with the information they need in a disaster 
situation. EMBC shares the relevant information they receive on fire, flood, and other events 
such as tsunamis from other government partners such as BCWS and the BC River Forecast 
Centre. Prepared BC is under the EMBC umbrella, and their role is to direct the messaging 
regrading an event to the public and to amplify the information that is coming from the main 
forecasting centre for that event. This is also true of other organizations such as FNESS, Simpcw 
FN, the City of Kamloops, and TNRD, all of which help to further communicate information 
from the forecasting organizations to their specific audience. For example, the City of Kamloops 
works to provide a high level of forecast to the public but makes this in a form accessible to the 
public with the necessary information and does not include the level of detail that they may 
receive from the forecasting agency. The TNRD recently invested in an emergency alert 
notification system that allows them to communicate to people’s email, phone, directly. FNESS 
also passes information onto communities they are working with noting that flood forecasting is 
easier than wildfire as we have 5, 20 and 100 year flood prediction which helps with 
communities understanding potential risk. 
  
3.8 Communicating with First Nations 
 A key lesson learned from our review on risk and crisis communication is that the 
approach taken needs to recognize differences between stakeholder types. When communicating 
with and between First Nations communities in the province, emergency management agencies 
need to align messaging to their audience and to be proactive, transparent, and demonstrate 
genuine consultation. 
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 The BC Wildfire Service strives to communicate effectively to all stakeholders and they 
recognize the importance of trust. To build and support trust, and to increase support for wildfire 
management practices, the BC Wildfire Service often hires individuals living in First Nations 
communities within wildfire-affected regions. They also noted that recognition of other cultural 
and sub-cultural differences is essential to their success, and put effort into understanding 
differences by community type (e.g., ranchers). 
 Emergency Management BC follows a similar approach and emphasized the need to 
communicate with all First Nations communities affected by wildfires. They pointed out that this 
is consistent with a Government of British Columbia requirement to communicate with these 
stakeholders. One challenge identified is to ensure that they are working with the right people in 
the community, and it was noted that this can be difficult at first given the roles of individuals as 
elected Chiefs, hereditary Chiefs, and staff in band offices. 
 For the First Nations’ Emergency Services Society, communication challenges are 
different in this respect. With a focus on fire services, fuel management, and emergency 
management, this organization works directly with their members who are First Nations 
communities themselves. This kind of relationship clearly has a different kind of dynamic than 
what one would expect to see between these communities and other kinds of emergency 
management agencies, and there are personal points of contact between communities and the 
Society. Since there is an emphasis on prevention in their work, the First Nations’ Emergency 
Services Society can also support good practices and processes for emergency operations 
centres.  
 Within the Simpcw First Nations, there is a well-designed and executed approach to 
emergency management. Staff in the community responsible for this work are trained, have 
	 75	
substantial long-term experience in their roles, undertake continuing education, and enjoy a 
strong relationship with their Chief and Council to execute plans through their emergency 
operations centre. With the Chief functioning as their primary public relations person, and a plan 
that is well understood by internal stakeholders, the Simpcw First Nations is able to prioritize 
how they respond to emergencies. They are also exploring the development of an emergency 
social services team. 
 The Simpcw First Nations characterized their plan as a “living document,” and they are 
proud of how comprehensive planning is within their community. With more than half of their 
51 employees trained for emergency operations centre positions, they are able to deploy 
resources and be proactive. Engaging the community includes hosting health and safety fairs, 
ongoing training and fundraising for their fire department, FireSmart programming, and safety 
training on wood stoves. Staff of their emergency operations centre also receive training through 
the Justice Institute of BC, and they use a holistic emergency preparedness consultant. Other 
kinds of expertise are incorporated, especially during debriefings. 
With respect to fire services, the City of Kamloops has a service agreement with the 
Tk’emlúps te Secwe̓pemc First Nations to provide fire protection and rescue services to Reserve 
lands including the community of Sun Rivers. This agreement also incorporates FireSmart 
education and sharing of other fire-related information. To improve communications, the City of 
Kamloops uses their emergency operations centre to regularly inform the First Nations 
community with initial contact flowing through the Chief and band council.  
The Thompson-Nicola Regional District noted that their approach to communication with 
First Nations was similar to how other stakeholders are consulted. Since these communities issue 
their own alerts and orders, the Regional District emphasized the importance of coordinating 
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messaging with them. Coordination can be challenging, and an example was provided of how 
one community issued an order well before the Thompson-Nicola Regional District for the same 
area which resulted in confusion.  
For PreparedBC and Emergency Info BC, communication with First Nations 
communities is different given their role in disseminating, interpreting, and amplifying 
information provided by others. Many First Nations communities have a limited presence on the 
internet including the use of social media. As a result, the role of these agencies in wildfire risk 
and crisis communication involves curating information that is available to assist in broad 
distribution to relevant stakeholders. A lot of this work involves building relationship with 
stakeholders before an event, and table top exercises, meetings, and training sessions help 
connect stakeholders and build relationships.  
 
3.9 Communication challenges during COVID-19 
 COVID-19 has created challenges for many organizations involved in emergency 
management. Fortunately, wildfire events in the province were substantially reduced during the 
2020 season in particular compared to 2017 and 2018. For the organizations consulted in this 
study, many of the same themes and issues were raised. They will be discussed in an aggregate 
fashion given these commonalities. 
 Building and fostering new relationships was a challenge for many emergency 
management organizations. Relationship building is critical during all stages of a wildfire event, 
and it is clear that knowing who to contact and knowledge of their role is essential for a well-
coordinated response. This is particularly the case with inter-agency consultation involving 
government to government communication as is required between the province and First Nations 
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communities. There were also some challenges associated with including external stakeholders 
given technological limitations in some remote communities. For some organizations involved in 
this study, this suggests the need for reflection and precaution going forward as technological 
failures of telecommunications infrastructure are possible with certain kinds of hazards  
(e.g., earthquake). Effort is required to develop better backup plans including deployment of 
more satellite telephones. 
Operationally, dealing with COVID-19 involved a learning curve where internal 
operations for organizations like Emergency Management BC and the BC Wildfire Service in 
particular had to shift significantly to virtual environments. Instead of having a command centre 
with many staff together at the same location, COVID-19 involved working from home for most 
staff. By all accounts this was a success although the systems were tested “lightly” due to 














4.1 A new lifecycle-based model for risk and crisis communication 
 
4.2 Interpretation and application of the model 
 Using the Möbius loop as inspiration, and taking styling cues from the 
internationally recognized and non-trademarked symbol for recycling, this model 
reinforces the need for a holistic, life-cycle based approach to risk and crisis 
communication. The model has several layers and should be interpreted from the 
inside-out and in a clockwise fashion.  
First, the centrality of local and Indigenous knowledge in the model recognizes 
that risk and crisis communication are processes that involves actual individuals and 
communities. Wildfires have the potential to generate negative impacts on built 
infrastructure including homes, community buildings, local businesses, places of 
worship, schools, etc. Remote and First Nations communities in particular have unique 
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insights and relationships with respect to the land that need to be respected. True and 
meaningful consultation is required at all stages of a wildfire event in order to reduce 
risk, respond in a culturally and socially responsible way, and to best utilize all existing 
resources. It is also important to recognize that multiple layers of governance and 
oversight exist in such communities as per recommendations by Abbott and Chapman 
(2018). 
 Second, the model also places safety and mental health in its core to emphasize 
that risk and crisis communication must place a premium on these variables. Although 
safety is often confused with risk, they do refer to different things. Safety is generally 
defined as a state of being that is free from risk. Although it is well-recognized that zero 
risk is impossible both conceptually and in practice, a tolerance or appetite for 
differential levels of risk can influence interpretations of safety. Mental health is 
intricately connected to this, and wildfire events can put affected individuals under 
significant levels of stress that may have short and long terms impacts. Mental health 
can be impacted at all stages of an event (pre, intra, and post), and communities in 
regions with more frequent wildfire events must pay particular attention to these factors. 
 Third, the life cycle of a wildfire involves shifting across pre-event, intra-event, 
and post-event stages. Each of these stages require a particular communication focus, 
although it is important to note that both risk and crisis communication will likely have to 
occur throughout all events to some degree. That said, there are dominant modes of 
communication that will naturally be focused on at each stage.  
At the pre-event stage, the emphasis will tend to be on risk communication. 
During this stage, there should be a concerted effort to practice sound and engaging 
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participatory decision-making. This can help prepare communities for wildfire events, 
and help make the response during a wildfire more predictable and consistent with best 
practices. Resources should be devoted towards educational initiatives, updating 
databases with contact information of key individuals at the community level, building 
and solidifying relationships, and conducting property-based risk reduction projects. 
Improvements to communications infrastructure should also be explored. 
The intra-event stage involves a shift to a crisis communication mode. It is 
important to stress that this stage requires that local/Indigenous knowledge and 
safety/mental health still remain top-of-mind. There is a tendency during an event to 
shift to a command-and-control approach as represented by the Incident Command 
System. Although important from an operational perspective, crisis communication must 
be sensitive to context and community if it is to be effective. Otherwise, competing 
messaging including misinformation can spread more easily through social media and 
by word of mouth. At this stage, the focus should be on providing timely and accurate 
information, inter-agency coordination, and mobilization practices including evacuation 
that are likely to have the greatest likelihood of success. 
The post-event stage can sometimes be difficult to gauge given that wildfires can 
occur again in a community within a given season. As a result, it may be necessary to 
practice a communications style that is a hybrid between crisis and risk communication 
throughout the season. By retaining some of the elements of crisis communication, 
flexibility to (re)mobilize a community exists and this can keep intact some of the 
operational channels for inter-agency coordination. This is also a time where risk 
communication can be emphasized. Again, it is essential to recognize how community 
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well-being, mental, health, and resiliency are involved. Communicating risk too soon 
after a serious wildfire event may trigger unanticipated responses and create higher 
levels of anxiety. A balancing act therefore exists here since it is also likely that 
communities fortunate enough to escape wide-scale damage can be motivated to 
support initiatives aimed at reducing future exposures. A return to full participatory 
decision-making, planning, and rebuilding infrastructure occurs during this stage 




















Risk and crisis communication models are often considered academic exercises, and it is 
clear that few emergency management organizations are likely to use them as blueprints that 
need to be followed step-by-step during an actual emergency. Although such models are 
conceptual in nature, the life cycle-based model proposed here encourages a holistic 
understanding of how to navigate through wildfire events. As indicated, the model distinguishes 
between various stages of a wildfire (pre, intra, and post) while positioning local/Indigenous 
knowledge and mental health/safety in the core. This model is not prescriptive in nature but 
should be considered as a representation of an interconnected set of considerations and trigger 
points to reflect upon. Beyond the model are several recommendations based on a review of the 
literature and consultations with a range of emergency management organizations in British 
Columbia. 
 
Recommendation 1: Since the scale and frequency of wildfire events has changed in recent 
years, and public concerns have intensified, emergency management organizations should reflect 
on current and past risk and crisis communication approaches. It is recommended that 
organizations make meaningful distinctions between risk and crisis communication, and have in 
place an approach that recognizes life cycle differences. Adoption of a particular model, or even 
the one proposed here, does not guarantee a sound approach although it may cultivate an 
enhanced appreciation of the nuances and complexities associated with communication. It is also 
essential to recognize the role of local and Indigenous knowledge at all stages of a wildfire event, 
and to focus on the safety and mental health of affected individuals and communities. This 
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requires cultivating a sense of compassion and respect, or what might be called an “ethics of 
care.” 
 
Recommendation 2: During a wildfire event, a premium is placed on accurate and timely 
information. It is important to stress that such qualities are necessary but not sufficient to 
motivate action or to reduce risk. Because trust is difficult to build and easy to lose, risk and 
crisis communication need to move beyond the simple transmission of facts. How a community 
responds to a wildfire can be highly variable, and individual responses are difficult to anticipate. 
The building and maintenance of trust between emergency management organizations and 
remote and First Nations communities must be a priority, and it should be recognized that trust is 
a two-way street. There is also value in building better bridges between emergency management 
organizations who work together to support optimal inter-agency coordination so that duplication 
of efforts is avoided. It is recommended that additional research by conducted on trust at these 
various levels. 
 
Recommendation 3: With wildfire events that unfold over longer stretches of time, or where 
many such events affect a community during one season, a tendency towards complacency can 
emerge. This can numb responses on many levels and result in increased risk. There also exists a 
challenge to get the right messaging to those who need it most. These issues can exist when 
communicating with internal and external stakeholders, and it is clear from this research that 
communication and coordination is only as good as the weakest link. With many remote and 
First Nations communities having limited access to broadband and cellular technology, wildfires 
can be more difficult to manage. Some communities still rely heavily on facsimile machines, and 
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door knocking notifications are used extensively to notify individuals about evacuation alerts and 
orders. It is clear that many geographic challenges still exist in remote communications and that 
inadequate technology is exacerbating the situation. It is recommended that a program be 
developed to increase the supply of satellite telephones in such communities, and that more 
training be provided on the use of this technology and how it can be integrated with other more 
traditional approaches including radio. It may be useful to also examine the utility of community 
alert systems that parallel approaches used in some coastal communities for tsunami alerts. 
Developing mechanisms to support amateur radio may also make sense given the relatively low-
cost involved and the existing network in place. 
 
Recommendation 4:  One challenge noted is that staff turnover at Emergency Operations Centres 
in remote and First Nations communities can impair communication. Staff turnover can occur for 
many reasons, and it was observed that in some communities the use of retired, volunteers 
occurs. It is recommended that better efforts be made to maintain updated databases of contact 
information. There may also be value in exploring how to reduce turnover, provide more cross-
training opportunities, and to find mechanisms to more formally transfer experience from long-
service personnel to new employees. The human side of business continuity planning is 
important and often undervalued. 
 
Recommendation 5: The use of social media as a tool for communicating with the public and 
other stakeholders is growing in popularity. Platforms like Twitter and Facebook have great 
potential to engage individuals and to communicate information quickly and inexpensively. That 
said, such technology can be a double-edged sword where the spread of misinformation or 
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disinformation represents a threat to emergency management organizations in terms of 
coordinating responses, maintaining trust, and mobilization efforts. Social media has more value 
in urban and in rural communities served well by broadband. It’s utility declines in many remote 
and First Nations communities. It is recommended that emergency response organizations 
coordinate and lobby to support initiatives to deploy broadband provincially. This can also 
include working with the telecommunications sector and government to establish better cellular 
telephone connectivity in such communities. There may be value in pushing telecommunications 
companies to offer differential rate structures in these communities to encourage wider-scale 
adoptions of the technology, and this may involve a subsidy structure. Cellular telephones enable 
the use of SMS alerting as well. 
 
Recommendation 6: It is recommended that a “lessons learned” approach be followed going 
forward to understand how to fine tune risk and crisis communication. One avenue involves 
examining and showcasing successful communities. In the interior of British Columbia, it is 
clear that the Simpcw First Nation is an exemplar in many respects. They have well-trained staff, 
understood roles and responsibilities between their Chief and Council and the Emergency 
Information Officer, and focus on building personal relationship to support one-on-one external 
communications. They also have historically low levels of staff turnover. Another avenue to 
explore involves learning from other kinds of natural hazards including floods, tsunamis, 
avalanches, and earthquakes in particular. This should not be limited to Canadian examples since 
many lessons can also be learned from international events. These events should be dissected 
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